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The countries of Eastern Europe achieved two remarkable transitions in the short period of the 
last two decades: from plan to market and, then, in the run-up to and entry into the European 
Union, they rode a wave of global trade and financial market integration. Focusing on the second 
transition, this paper reaches three conclusions. First, by several metrics, East European and East 
Asian growth performances were about on par from the mid-1990s; both regions far surpassed 
Latin American growth. Second, the mechanisms of growth in East Europe and East Asia were, 
however, very different. East Europe relied on a distinctive—often discredited—model, 
embracing financial integration with structural change to compensate for appreciating real 
exchange rates. In contrast, East Asia contained further financial integration and maintained 
steady or depreciating real exchange rates. Third, the ongoing financial turbulence has, thus far, 
not had an obviously differential impact on emerging market regions: rather, the hot spots in each 
region reflect individual country vulnerabilities. If the East European growth model is distinctive, 
is it sustainable and replicable? The paper speculates on the possibilities. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
This paper has documents remarkable economic achievements of the group of 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) nations that emerged from decades under socialist 
planning to vibrant market economies within the fold of the European Union (EU). The 
impressive transformation occurred in a matter of less than two decades. And within that 
short time span, there were, in turn, two distinct transitions—from planned to market 
systems and then increased economic sophistication riding on the wave of globalization. 
The paper goes on to argue that the second transition was the result of an economic 
development model that has no recent precedent. Indeed, to the extent that the CEE 
approach to growth and structural transformation had been attempted in the post-World 
War II period, it stood largely discredited. For these reasons, the paper offers a broader 
comparative commentary on the economic achievements and growth strategy of two other 
groups of emerging market economies, those in Latin America and, especially, in East 
Asia. 
 
It is the case that even as this paper is being written, a globally-coordinated shock 
of a substantial magnitude is propagating its waves through the world economy. The CEE 
economies are being subjected to a severe test. Some countries, in particular, had placed 
themselves in a more vulnerable situation than others and they are likely to suffer 
substantial contraction. However, as of this writing, it is not evident that the CEE 
economies as a group will ultimately be impacted more so than other regions. As the 
global crisis continues to unfold, countries in all regions are feeling the pressure, with 
specific countries in those regions under particular stress, reflecting their specific 
vulnerabilities. Within the CEE and elsewhere, country efforts will need to complement 
global initiatives to cushion the shock and help preserve the gains achieved. 
 
And the CEE gains before the crisis hit were substantial. Consider a metric of the 
accomplishments. The GDP per capita (in PPP terms) of each of the ten CEE countries 
we consider is measured as a ratio of the GDP per capita of the EU-15 (the first fifteen 
members of the European Union). 
We start the story in 1995, by 
when the turmoil from the first 
transition was largely complete 
and all countries had passed 
beyond their lowest output point 
following the break from 
communism (see Fischer and 
Sahay, 2004). Figure 1(a) shows 
the subsequent gains through 
2003, the year before eight of the 
ten countries (i.e., all other than 
Bulgaria and Romania) entered the 
EU. Although, the starting points of the countries varied widely—from a low of 30 
percent for a number of countries to about 70 percent for the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia—all countries gained on the more affluent EU-15. Recall, this phase included    3  
the emerging market crises from Mexico to Russia, the last of which in particular hurt 
some of the CEE economies. After 2003, with the entry of eight countries in the EU and 
strengthening prospects of Bulgarian and Romanian entry, the climb continued and was 
about as strong and about as broad-based. Particularly impressive was the increase 
achieved by the Czech Republic from its already high per capita income; in contrast, 
Hungary, a star of previous years, made modest gains. 
 
To place this achievement in perspective, we compare it with the gains made by 
Latin American and East Asian economies over the same period. Here we benchmark the 
per capita income to the United States per capita income, taking simple averages of the 
countries in each group (Figure 1(b)).
2 Clearly, there is often significant variation within 
each group and so the picture we portray does not do justice to individual achievements 
within each region. Nevertheless, the comparative trends are revealing. The CEE 
economies had an average per capita income ratio relative to the U.S. per capita income 
of 29 percent in 1995, which increased by 12 percentage points to 41 percent in 2007. The 
Latin American experience is a 
clear contrast. The average per 
capita GDP relative to the 
United States has remained 
below 25 percent since 1995. 
The ratio actually fell during the 
crisis years from 1995 to 2003 
and in the next four years 
merely regained the 1995 level. 
Thus, it was not just the 1980s 
that were a lost decade for the 
Latin America but despite 
efforts at macroeconomic 
stabilization and more openness, 
Latin America has failed to gain any significant ground now for almost 30 years (though 
as Zettelmeyer, 2006, suggests the variation within Latin America may be higher than in 
other regions, masking significant differences across countries). The East Asian 
economies made rather more progress. Recall also that East Asia economies had 
experienced exceptional growth for several years prior to 1995, some from the 1970s and, 
as such, their scope for further growth was more restricted. The crisis years definitely 
slowed down East Asia, not surprising since countries in the region were at the epicenter 
of the turmoil during 1997-98. Thereafter, East Asian economies resumed their catch up 
process. 
 
The questions of interest then are: did development and growth strategies vary 
















Figure 1(b): GDP per capita as a share of US GDP, major emerging market regions, 1995-2007
                                                 
2 Unless otherwise stated, the group of Latin American countries includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Perú, and Venezuela, and the group of East Asia countries includes China P.R., Hong 
Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, and Thailand.    4  
have made? This paper’s thesis is that the CEE nations have embraced the opportunities 
of globalization—along with its potential downsides and risks—more so than any other 
region. This approach distinguishes their growth achievements, the mechanisms of 
growth, and the structural transformation witnessed. Two features of the policy approach 
are particularly relevant. First, international financial integration has been a central aspect 
of the growth strategy. That integration has contributed to sustained inflows of capital, 
including not only foreign direct investment but also bank lending and portfolio flows. 
The counterpart of these flows has been a sometimes large current account deficit. 
Second, with capital inflows, real exchange rates have been allowed to appreciate. But the 
commitment to trade openness has remained unwavering, as countries’ external trade has 
become an increasing share of their GDP. In turn, maintaining competitiveness has 
required a transformation of the product structure and quality.
3 
 
This approach, combining real exchange rate appreciation and current account 
deficits, stood largely discredited. Indeed, the collapse of Latin American economies in 
the midst of the debt crisis of the 1980s is often attributed to just such a strategy. In the 
1960s and 1970s, Latin America did grow rapidly, borrowing from abroad. But the Latin 
American economies failed to sustain their competitive ability and the debtors’ loss of 
confidence led to their withdrawal and a severe crunch. Similarly, these factors also 
contributed to the East Asian crisis of 1997-98. And, indeed, that risk remains in the CEE 
economies, and, as the global financial turbulence continues, the risk may be turning into 
a reality for some economies. A sharp contraction is ongoing especially in those countries 
that experienced the most heady growth rates. Could there be lasting consequences with a 
prolonged slowdown? 
 
The contrast with East Asia is noteworthy. The East Asian growth miracle has 
been viewed through widely varying lenses, with some seeing the experience as evidence 
that markets do not by themselves deliver growth, and need to be “governed” by wise 
politicians and technocrats (Wade, 1990) and others insisting on the primacy of the 
disciplines and opportunities afforded by international markets (World Bank, 1993). 
These debates have receded following the Asian crisis and the focus has shifted to how 
countries choose to interact with global markets. East Asia has once again attracted 
approval (Prasad, Rajan, and Subramaniam, 2006, and Rodrik, 2008). In broad terms, 
with some country variation, the East Asian approach has been an amalgam of reinforcing 
elements that include: relatively high savings rates (postponed consumption), a lid on 
currency appreciation, a modest pace of international financial integration, resulting in 
small current account deficits or even surpluses and growing international reserves.
 4 East 
Asia has moved in the direction of self-insurance through reserve accumulation rather 
                                                 
3 The CEE countries also participate in the European labor market, which despite its current restrictions 
allows considerable and increasing mobility. Countries in other regions have more particular—historically 
and geographically determined—opportunities for benefiting from international labor mobility. The 
complexity of this issue and the limited data preclude analysis in this paper. 
4 Rodrik (2008) argues that an undervalued real exchange rate compensates for institutional weaknesses, 
which would otherwise thwart the growth of the tradeables sector necessary for overall growth.    5  
than international risk sharing and intertemporal consumption smoothing. However, in 
common with the CEE, East Asian economies have undertaken an impressive 
transformation in its export structure (as in the CEE). 
 
This paper does not attempt a normative evaluation of the different approaches to 
engagement with globalization. Rather, the rest of the paper documents the features of the 
growth strategy and the growth outcomes in the CEE, Latin America, and East Asia. The 
next section focuses on the CEEs. It describes the increasing reliance of all countries in 
this region on international trade and financial markets, accompanied by the strengthening 
of domestic institutions. While the extent to which any one country has proceeded in a 
particular direction differs, the overall similarity of the thrust is striking. This is followed 
by a comparative perspective across the three regions of interest. Here the differences are 
striking. To assess the outcomes from these strategies, the next section reports on the 
growth outcomes resulting from their differing development strategies, reporting a 
descriptive analysis of growth accelerations and the findings of growth regressions. A 
concluding section speculates on the sustainability and replicability of the CEE growth 
model. 
 
II.   OPENNESS AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE CEES 
  The degree of trade openness has increased steadily in all countries, with the 
exception of Romania, where it appears to have stalled in recent years (Figure 2(a)). In 
1995, the ratio of trade (exports plus imports) to GDP was less than 100 percent for 5 of 
the 10 countries we consider. By 2007, there were only two such countries, Poland and 
Romania. Clearly, many of the CEE countries are small and it is to be expected that they 
will be open to trade. What is remarkable is the continued and substantial increase in 
trading relationships. In this regard, the CEE countries have been riding an international 
wave of globalization, wherein trade has, in general, grown faster than production. Within 
Europe, even the more advanced economies have participated to an increasing degree in 
international trade.     6  
Thus, the trade to GDP 
ratio of the EU-15 
increased by almost 20 
percentage points from 
just under 60 percent in 
1995 to just under 80 
percent in 2007. Nine of 
the 10 CEE countries 
increased their ratios by 
more than 20 percent; 
only Estonia, which was 
already highly open in 
1995, experienced a 
somewhat smaller 
increase in the trade-to-
GDP ratio.
5 
Figure 2 (a). CEE Trade Openess Trends, 1995-2007


















1/ Data for Romania are available starting in 1998.
 
  The rapid increase of the trade-to-GDP ratios in the CEE economies is also seen in 
their increased market shares (shares of their exports in world exports). Again, the timing 
and the extent vary by 
country but in all cases the 
gains are significant (Figure 
2(b)). Note, as we discuss 
below, this is a key factor 
differentiating the CEE from 
the other regions: the 
increase in market sha
achieved even while the 
exchange rates were 
appreciating significantly. 
The appreciation is typically 
attributed to the so-called 
Balassa-Samuelson effect. 
While the size of this effect 
remains controversial, there is a more basic ongoing process. The dual processes of catch 
up in per capita incomes and the integration into Europe has meant that prices in the CEE 
countries have also been catching up with European price levels. Fighting this process of 
real exchange rate appreciation would risk negating also the gains from the convergence 
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Figure 2(b): CEE World Market Shares and Real Exchange Rate Trends, 1995-2007
res was 
                                                
 
 
5 Here, as elsewhere in the paper, we have not explored the implications of the geographical distribution of 
trade. The CEE continue to trade heavily in Europe, while the East Asian and Latin American economies 
rely to a much greater extent on the United States. These differences could eventually have implications for 
growth.    7  
  The implication, therefore, is that the combination of increased market shares with 
appreciation of the real exchange rate has required a substantial transformation of the 
economy (see also European Commission, 2003, for documentation of the transformation 
of the economic structure of these countries). While there are many facets of this 
transformation, we focus here on the structure of exports. Two findings (detailed in 
Fabrizio, Igan, and Mody, 2006) are a rise in the product quality and an increased 
technological content of the exports. These trends are summarized in Figures 3.
6 The 
quality of a product is proxied by the unit value of the country’s exports relative to the 
average unit value of world’s exports of the same product. For the country, then, we 
aggregate these unit values over finely defined products to obtain an aggregate unit value 
ratio. A rise in this ratio implies that the country’s unit values are rising faster than that of 
the world. This is what we see for most countries. Figure 3 reports the logarithm of the 
unit value ratios and, as such, a value of zero implies that the country’s product quality is 
at the same level as the world exports. Of the CEE countries, Latvia and Lithuania are just 
above the world level in 2004 (the most recent year for which disaggregated data 
comparable across countries is available). These countries also did not experience a 
significant rise in their unit value ratios or in the high- and medium-tech component of 
their exports (Figure 3). Thus, much of their increased export share in world trade has 
reflected a catch up process from under representation in global trade; it is possible that 
changes are occurring at a finer level that we are not able to capture. Looking ahead, they, 
nevertheless, face the challenge of moving beyond a phase in which gains have been 
relatively easy. For the rest, the changes have been substantial, both in terms of product 
quality and in product structure. The gains have been principally in “medium-high” 
technology products, as the share of the low and medium-low products has declined. At 
the same time, many of these products are differentiated, such that product quality is 
valued more so than in standardized products that are bought principally for the most 
competitive price (for details see Fabrizio, Igan, and Mody, 2006). 
 
 
                                                 
6 This figure does not include Bulgaria and Romania; the next draft will attempt to incorporate them.    8  
 
 
Figure 3. CEE Structural Transformation of Exports, 1994-2004
(Share in percent of country exports)
Sources: UN Comtrade; and IMF staff calculations.
1/ UVR is the unit value of a country's exports divided by the unit value of world exports. Expressed in 
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  In parallel to their trade integration, the CEE countries have proceeded rapidly 
towards financial integration (see European Commission, 2006). Entry into the EU has 
been accompanied by liberalization of their capital accounts. This has been accompanied 
by extensive capital inflows and outflows. While the countries have been mainly 
recipients of capital from abroad (mainly from advanced European countries and, 
especially in the early phase in the form of foreign direct investment), they have more 
fundamentally placed themselves in a network of capital flow transactions in the region. 
Foreign banks that have established subsidiaries and branches in the CEE have been 
conduits of foreign capital for extensive lending to domestic businesses and households. 
As they have been integrated into European markets, sovereigns and corporates have 
borrowed on international capital markets at increasing lower spreads. Before the onset of 
the recent financial turbulence, Lithuania was paying virtually no risk premium over the 
rates charged to the German sovereign. While, in retrospect, some might argue that the 
markets were being imprudent in pricing risk, financial integration has allowed access to 
substantial capital inflows. At the same time, many of the CEE (along with other 
countries at or below their income levels in other regions) are also exporters of capital. As 
their firms have acquired greater financial strength and managerial self-confidence, they 
have expanded by moving into neighboring countries and beyond. 
 
  These trends are summarized in Figure 4, where financial integration is measured 
as the sum of external assets and external liabilities as a ratio of GDP (analogous to 
exports plus imports as a share of GDP). The increase in financial integration is sharp 
everywhere. From less than 
100 percent in the mid-
1990s, the financial 
integration ratio has 
increased to above 
200 percent in a number
countries in just over a 
decade. While the metrics are
not strictly comparable, thi
increase by about 100 per-
centage points in many case
is considerably larger than 
the 20-40 percentage po










Figure 4. CEE Trends in Financial Integration, 1995-2007
















  Finally, openness has been accompanied by institutional strengthening (see 
Roland, 2005). Strong institutions are important to sustaining the engagement with
product and financial markets and also in supporting efficient outcomes from that 
engagement. The extent to which this complementarity has played out in the CEE 
economies is not easy to identify precisely. Fischer and Sahay (2004) do conclude that 
institutional strengthening in these economies has been key to their growth process (a
Schadler et al. 2006). The examination of the role of institutions in the CEE requires    10  
further thought. Fischer and Sahay (2004) use a broad measure of institutions to includ
the development of central banks, treasuries, tax systems, commercial law, and, more 
broadly, the development of the market economy through measures such as privat
Their analysis then focuses on the variation in such measures within the group of 
transition economies. If instead, a comparison is sought across European emergi
economies and other regions, then it is necessary to use other indices for which 
comparable cross-country data is available. The Figure 5 reports the governance 
indicators of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This aggregate measure doe
not show large changes over time within particular countries in the CEE. As discussed 
below, in general, the ICRG measures show the CEE averages to be generally higher than 
that for the other regions; but, interestingly, over time, the other regions have caught up in
the aggregate, there are subcomponents in which the CEE have apparently declined, and
others in which they are lower than emerging markets in other regions. The analysis of 
institutions in the CEE is also complicated by the regulatory harmonization and factor 
mobility within the European Union (EU), reflected in its accumulated body of la
acquis communautaire. Clearly, by reducing borders to the rest of Europe, these 
regulatory changes played an important role. On the fiscal institutions front, CEE 
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III.   EMERGING MARKET REGIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 
  In this section, we follow the same sequence, using the same metrics, to place the 
CEE achievements in perspective. In summary, we conclude that the CEE have moved 
faster with respect to trade integration (despite their real exchange rate appreciation), 
have moved decisively faster in terms of financial integration, and about on par (when 
judged by a variety of metrics) with respect to institutional development. Given our focus 
here on the CEE, we do not examine the inter-country differences for Latin America and 
East Asia, except to point out where the inclusion in the East Asian averages of Hong 
Kong SAR and Singapore, two city states premised on external links, misrepresents the 
more general tendencies in that region. Because we do not discuss, individual country 
experiences in the other regions, readers may justifiably question some of our general 
characterizations. 
 
Consider, first, the trends in trade openness. For the CEE countries, the increase in 
openness at the country level reported in the previous section is seen in the steady rise for 
the region as a whole (Figure 7). East Asia’s trade openness has followed a similar track 
(this chart excludes Hong Kong SAR and Singapore, which are very open by this measure 
and further raise East Asian estimated openness).  
 
The contrast with Latin America is striking. Unlike for the CEE and East Asia, 
where openness has been upwards of 100 percent, that for Latin America is closer to 50 
percent. As we have cautioned above, these regional comparisons need to be interpreted 
with care. Some of the Latin American countries, e.g., Brazil, are large and it is to be 
expected that trade will play a smaller role in large countries. Nevertheless, even the 
increase over time in Latin America’s openness index has been lackluster. These trends 
are mirrored in export shares (Figure 8). Starting from a low base of just above 1½ 
percent of world exports in 1995, the CEE share approached 4 percent in 2007. East Asia 
was an exporting powerhouse already in 1995 but nevertheless increased its share of the 
world market by about 3 percentage points by 2007 to almost 20 percent. The Latin 
American world share, in contrast, remained in a narrow range between 4 and 5 percent. 
It is possible to interpret the data as suggesting that there was some modest increase in 
Latin America’s share between 1995 and 2000 but that it is remained stable since then, 
while the CEE and East Asia have continued to gain ground. 
 
  The juxtaposition of these trends in export shares against real exchange rate trends 
highlights an important difference between the CEE and East Asia. In the CEE, as noted 
above, the real exchange rate has steadily appreciated but despite that export shares have 
also increased. East Asia’s real exchange rate, in contrast, has trended down, although 
since 2004 the downtrend may have partially reversed. Thus, East Asian gain in market 
share has at least in part been helped by favorable exchange rate movements. The Latin 
American real exchange rate has, along with its export share, remained relatively flat.    14  
 
 
Figure 7. Regional Trends in Trade and Financial Openness, 1995-2007
Source: IMF.
Trade Openness, 1995-2007
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Figure 8. Regional Trends in Export Shares and Real Effective Exchange Rates, 
1995-2007





















Export Share to World

















Export Share to World

















Export Share to World
REER (2000=100, right scale)   16  
 
  These trends are linked to those in financial integration and current account 
developments. Here the differentiation between the CEE and East Asia sharpens. The 
CEE openness ratio increased from about 75 percent in 1995 to about 225 percent in 
2007, a three-fold increase. Though East was also trending up in the 1990s, following the 
crisis in the later part of the decade, that trend came to an abrupt stop. In this regard, East 
Asia and Latin America are closer to each other, in level and even trend. Further, in 
Abiad, Leigh, and Mody (2008) we argue that financial integration in Europe has been 
associated with a downhill flow of capital from rich to poor countries. This has meant that 
the CEE economies have run current account deficits reflecting the inflow of capital 
(Figure 9). The East Asian economies, as is well known, have run surpluses in recent 
years. Thus, the East Asian economies while restricting their further international 
financial engagement also began to self insure by running surpluses and accumulating 
reserves. While the CEE economies have been able to supplement domestic savings with 
foreign savings, allowing consumption to rise in anticipation of future income growth. In 
this regard, as with financial integration, Latin America has tended to be more like East 
Asia, with a greater tendency over time to self insure. 
 
Finally, we once again see that the CEE emphasis on trade and financial openness 
has been supported by strong institutions (Figure 10). Here, there are three observations, 
which require further analysis and reflection. First, in the aggregate ICRG measure, the 
CEE have overall led the other regions. In the most recent years, though, the others have 
caught up and the small fall in the CEE reflects a downgrading of Latvia by the CEE. 
Second, the one area in which the CEE have both led and improved their performance is 
“democratic accountability,” though again by this measure, the others have also caught 
up. Finally, in terms of “law and order,” all are thought to have declined in effectiveness. 
 
IV.   GROWTH OUTCOMES 
  These trends can now be related to growth outcomes. This section reports new 
work on growth accelerations and some results also from earlier comparative cross-
country growth analysis. In general, the picture that emerges is that the CEE performance 
in recent years is impressive, but it is about on par with East Asia.  
 
A.   Accelerations 
This section focuses on turning points in growth performance, i.e., rapid 
accelerations in growth that are sustained for at least five years, and attempts to 
differentiate growth accelerations in the CEEs from those observed elsewhere. Box 1 
details the criteria for assessing growth “accelerations” and Table 1 reports the identified 
growth acceleration episodes. These are broadly consistent with the episodes identified by 
Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005).     17  
 
 
Figure 9. Current Account Trends, 1995-2007
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Source: IMF.   18  
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Sources: International Country Risk Guide (2008) and authors' estimates.      19  
 
Box 1. Growth Accelerations: Methodology and Data  
 
The key feature of a growth takeoff is a both a high level of growth and a substantial 
acceleration in growth. Following the methodology of Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik 
(2005), growth accelerations are defined as episodes in which the real per capita PPP 
GDP growth rate increases by at least 2 percentage points, and in which growth averages 
at least 3.5 percent per year over a five-year horizon.
1 
 
Formally, let growth rate gt,t+n denote the growth rate of GDP per capita (y) at time t over 
horizon n, where: 
 
  gt,t+i = ln(yt+i) – ln(yt),  i=1, ... , n. 
 
Let the initial horizon, i.e. the minimum length of growth accelerations, be N, and the 
change in the growth rate at time t be Δgt, where Δgt = gt,t+n – gt-n,t 
 
Identification of the onset of growth accelerations is based on the following two criteria: 
 
(1)   gt,t+n ≥ Z percent per annum, i.e., growth is rapid; and 
(2)   Δgt ≥ Y percent per annum, i.e., growth accelerates. 
 
Once a growth acceleration is underway, identification of the end of the acceleration is 
based on the following two criteria: 
 
(3)   gt,t+n ≤ X Æ growth for the following N-year period dips below X percent per 
annum;  
(4)   gt+1,t+2 ≤ W Æ annual growth for the following year dips below W percent per 
annum. 
 
The parameters used for the analysis are N = 5; Z = 3.5; Y = 2; X = 2; W = 3. Relaxing the 
thresholds for identifying growth takeoffs produces a larger number of accelerations.  
 
The regions included in the analysis include: (i) a global sample comprising all countries 
with a peak population of more than 1 million; (ii) the CEE; (iii) East Asia and Pacific 
(Cambodia, China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Lao, Malaysia, Mongolia, Papua 
New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam); and (iv) Latin America 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela). Since N = 5, the earliest 
and latest years for start of growth acceleration are 1965 and 2002, respectively. 
______________________________ 
1The algorithm for identifying growth accelerations was generously provided by Jeromin Zettelmeyer and 
Jean Salvati. 












Emerging Europe Bulgaria 1998 -3.8 5.1 8.9 9
Czech Republic 2000 1.1 4.4 3.2 7
Estonia 1992 -6.5 3.5 10.0 15
Hungary 1995 -2.1 3.8 5.9 12
Latvia 1994 -12.1 3.8 15.9 13
Lithuania 1996 -8.8 3.5 12.3 11
Poland 1991 -1.7 4.4 6.1 16
Romania 1999 -0.1 4.9 5.0 8
Slovak Republic 1993 -6.5 4.8 11.3 14
Slovenia 1995 -0.5 4.3 4.8 12
East Asia Pacific Cambodia 1999 0.9 4.7 3.8 8
China,P.R. 1976 1.5 4.6 3.0 31
Hong Kong SAR 1968 5.8 8.7 2.8 26
Hong Kong SAR 1999 -0.5 3.5 4.0 8
Indonesia 1965 -0.9 3.9 4.8 31
Indonesia 2002 -1.5 4.2 5.7 5
Korea 1965 3.7 8.2 4.5 42
Lao People's Dem.Rep 1991 1.0 4.0 3.0 16
Malaysia 1969 3.1 5.3 2.2 15
Malaysia 1989 1.6 5.6 4.0 8
Mongolia 2000 1.8 4.1 2.4 7
Papua New Guinea 1969 1.8 4.3 2.5 4
Papua New Guinea 1988 0.6 5.0 4.4 6
Singapore 1965 7.1 10.7 3.6 32
Thailand 1975 2.6 5.5 2.9 21
Thailand 2001 -0.4 4.8 5.2 6
Vietnam 1989 2.1 4.3 2.2 18
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Latin America Argentina 1966 1.2 3.5 2.3 5
Argentina 1989 -3.8 6.5 10.3 8
Argentina 2002 -4.3 7.5 11.8 5
Bolivia 1971 -1.9 3.6 5.5 5
Brazil 1966 2.0 6.2 4.3 11
Chile 1975 -2.8 5.2 8.0 5
Chile 1985 -1.6 4.2 5.8 13
Colombia 1967 1.2 4.0 2.8 12
Colombia 2002 -0.8 4.0 4.8 5
Costa Rica 2002 1.8 4.4 2.6 5
Dominican Republic 1967 -0.8 5.1 5.9 8
Dominican Republic 1991 0.0 4.5 4.5 16
Ecuador 1968 1.9 6.6 4.7 10
Guatemala 1967 2.0 4.0 2.0 13
Haiti 1975 -0.2 3.7 3.9 5
Haiti 1989 -2.7 3.7 6.4 9
Honduras 1974 0.5 4.0 3.6 5
Jamaica 1967 2.9 6.7 3.8 5
Jamaica 1985 -0.9 4.4 5.3 5
Mexico 1995 -0.4 4.0 4.4 5
Panama 1975 1.9 4.8 2.8 7
Panama 2001 1.1 4.2 3.1 6
Paraguay 1973 2.5 5.2 2.6 8
Peru 1990 -4.0 4.2 8.2 5
Peru 2001 0.3 4.7 4.4 6
Trinidad and Tobago 1971 0.7 5.5 4.8 11
Trinidad and Tobago 1994 -0.6 4.0 4.6 13
Uruguay 1974 1.0 4.2 3.3 6
Uruguay 1991 2.1 4.2 2.1 7
Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 2002 -3.4 5.5 8.9 5
 
Note: table reports growth during five-year period before start of acceleration, growth during first five years 
of acceleration episode, and the difference in growth. 
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There were a large number of growth accelerations in the CEE in the past 15 
years. In the original Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005) article, which introduced 
this concept of accelerations, there were only two CEE accelerations because their data 
stopped in 1997. Table 2 reports the estimated (unconditional) probability of growth 
acceleration. The probability is defined as the number of growth acceleration episodes 
divided by the number of country-years in which an episode could have occurred. For the 
global sample, the average probability is found to be 4 percent, implying that a typical 
country would have a chance of about 33 percent of experiencing a growth takeoff in a 
given decade. In the CEEs, the estimated probability is higher, at about 7 percent per 
year, somewhat higher than that in East Asia and Latin America. However, the table also 
suggests that the longevity of growth spurts has been greatest in East Asia, averaging 15 
years, compared with 12 years for the CEE, and 8 years for Latin America.
7 
 
Table 2. Frequency of Growth Accelerations, by Region 
Region Frequency (percent) Avg. Duration Episodes Observations
All 4.0 9 157 3956
CEE 6.9 12 10 144
East Asia Pacific 4.4 15 20 457
Latin America 4.3 8 30 698
Memo items:
Middle East North Africa 3.5 9 14 395
South Saharan Africa 3.9 7 50 1270
 
Table reports number of growth episodes divided by number of observations in each region. 
 
 
Table 3 examines what variables are correlated with the start of growth 
accelerations. The table reports the average change in the value of a given variable during 
the first five years of growth acceleration. It also reports whether the change is 
significantly different from zero.
8 The general trends reported in the previous section are 
amply confirmed for the growth acceleration episodes. 
 
                                                 
7 The analysis is based on data up to end-2007. 
8 The timing of the growth acceleration is taken to be the 3-year period centered on the dates listed in Table 
1. A three-year window reduces the risk of narrowly missing the timing of acceleration.    23  
 
Table 3. Correlates of Growth Accelerations 
(Change during first five years) 
Region All CEE EAP LAC
Macroeconomic Circumstances
Investment/GDP 1.865*** 3.147** 3.197*** 2.293***
Exports/GDP 0.70 4.26 4.79 1.85
Imports/GDP 1.49 7.141*** 1.64 0.73
REER (increase = appreciation) -3.86 21.94*** -20.55* 0.22
Inflation -86.08*** -118.5** -17.82 -61.92
Terms of Trade 4.115** 6.807*** 4.70 6.954*
CA deficit/GDP -0.749* 3.618** -1.45 -1.21
Political Circumstances
Polity IV: Composite 0.28 0.963* -0.26 0.48
Polity IV: Excecutive Constraints 0.121* 0.296* -0.03 0.313*
ICRG: Composite Index 6.626*** 6.262** 5.682** 7.900***
ICRG: Democratic Accountability 0.405*** 0.594** -0.21 0.529***
EU Integration Index 0.220***
Economic Liberalization
Trade Openness 7.485*** 8.360* 25.21*** 5.053***
Financial Openness (de facto) 27.66*** 33.05*** 1.45 14.88*
Financial Openness (de jure) 0.228*** 1.165*** 0.15 0.28
Presence of Foreign Banks 16.06*** 40.92*** 18.38*** -2.88
Private Credit/GDP 2.850*** 0.88 2.51 2.359**
EBRD - Large scale privatn. 0.975***
EBRD - Small scale privatn. 0.764***
EBRD - Enterprise restruct. 0.605***
EBRD - Price liberalization 0.369***
EBRD - Trade and forex 0.665***
EBRD - Competition policy 0.543***
EBRD - Banking reform 0.765***
EBRD - Securities markets 0.889***
EBRD - Overall infrastr. 0.937***
  
Statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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•  Growth accelerations in CEE have many standard features, such as increases in 
private investment, declines in inflation, and improvements in the terms of trade.  
 
•  While trade openness—increased exports and imports—are associated with growth 
accelerations, in the CEE, stepped-up imports are more salient, consistent with their 
increased current account deficits during accelerations. The difference with the other 
two regions is clear. 
 
•  Another key difference is the significant appreciation in real exchange rate within the 
CEE, which contrasts with depreciation during the growth accelerations in East Asia. 
 
•  Financial openness and the presence of foreign banks also more reliably predict 
growth accelerations in the CEE.
9  
 
•  Increasing democratic accountability and institutional quality, as measured by widely-
used indicators, play a particularly important role in CEE growth accelerations.
10 
 
•  Finally, the process of integration with the European Union (EU)—measured by an 
index capturing membership application, negotiation, accession, ERM-II entry, and 
Euro adoption—is a statistically significant predictor of growth accelerations.
11 
Furthermore, a regression analysis suggests that EU integration has predictive power 
for growth accelerations that goes beyond that contained in standard indicators of 
institutional quality and economic liberalization (not reported here). 
 
                                                 
9 The presence of foreign banks is measured as the percentage of foreign banks in total bank assets, and is 
taken from Claessens et al. (2008). In related work, Herrmann and Winkler (2008) find evidence that the 
presence of foreign banks contributes to explaining the difference between the current account balances of 
emerging Asia and CEE countries. De-facto financial openness is measured as the sum of external assets 
and liabilities in percent of GDP. De-jure financial openness is measured using an updated version of the 
widely-used Chinn and Ito (2006) capital-account-openness index. 
10 The Polity IV database has been widely used by researchers as a source of data on political-institutional 
features (see Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2007). The Polity IV 
composite index ranks countries’ political institutions on a 21-point scale, with higher values corresponding 
to greater degree of democracy than autocracy. The Polity IV executive constraints sub-index measures the 
extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, and ranges from 0 
to 10 with a higher score indicating less de facto operational independence (and more accountability) of the 
country's chief executive.  
11 Following Danninger and Jaumotte (2008), the index measures the degree of European integration, and is 
built as a score (from 0 to 1) for achieving different stages of the formal integration process, namely 0.2 
points each for EU membership application, initiation of negotiation for EU membership, EU accession, 
entry into ERM II, and euro adoption.    25  
B.   Traditional Growth Analysis 
  In more conventional growth studies (Schadler et al., 2006 and Abiad, Leigh, and 
Mody, 2008), we reach several conclusions that underline the achievements of the CEEs 
while also offering cautionary lessons. First, total factor productivity growth has played a 
significantly more important role in the CEE during recent years than is the case in East 
Asia; in Latin America, total factor productivity has either been flat or even tended to 
decline. Second, some of the gains achieved by the CEE were related to exogenous 
factors. The Baltic nations, in particular, started with low initial per capita incomes 
allowing for more scope for catch up. Throughout the CEE region, relatively low 
population growth rates have also helped in achieving per capita income gains. Third, 
policy institutional development has helped the CEEs: but here the picture is mixed. The 
Baltic countries, in particular, have benefited from small governments, trade openness, 
advances in education, and institutional development. The Central European economies 
also benefit from trade openness and enjoy the educational and institutional advantages 
but their larger government size, the cross-country regressions suggest, pulls their growth 
down. Finally, a key advantage that the CEE economies enjoy is access to foreign capital. 
Abiad, Leigh, and Mody (2008) show that in the CEE, the downward flow of capital has 
been associated with more rapid income convergence. While all CEEs have benefited 
from this process, those with lower income gained more. 
 
  In sum, while the advantages vis-à-vis Latin America are clear, the mix of factors 
vis-à-vis East Asia do not give the CEE a decisive advantage. While openness and 
institutional development have complemented each other to give the CEE a strong boost, 
important challenges lie ahead. As the Baltic nations made further progress, the easy 
catch up possibilities will be increasingly exhausted. For the Central European 
economies, the challenges are also likely to come from fiscal challenges. Achieving 
leaner governments will imply making difficult choices on expenditure priorities and 
greater efficiency of public service delivery; this, in turn, will allow lowering tax rates 
increasingly necessitated by international tax competition. Not least, the very openness of 
the CEEs, especially financial openness, exposes them to a reversal of capital of flows. 
Even if sudden stops in capital flows do not materialize, Blanchard (2006) has cautioned 
that continued real exchange rate appreciation may yet produce new tests of 
competitiveness. 
 
V.   FINANCIAL TURBULENCE: A TEST OF THE ECONOMIC MODEL? 
The ongoing financial turbulence has put the CEE model to test. Current accounts 
are shrinking and growth is slowing rapidly. Some economies are contracting. Economic 
convergence will almost certainly be set back in the short run. But a bigger risk is that the 
reinforcing relationship between capital inflows and growth on which the CEE model is 
based could break down. This would reaffirm the view of some that the model is 
inherently unstable, either because capital flows are fickle or because the incentives of 
policymakers, firms, and households ultimately generates behavior that proves inimical to 
the success of the model. Keen observers remain concerned that Eastern Europe, with its 
current account deficits and elevated international financial exposure, will prove to be    26  
particularly vulnerable to ongoing developments. Thus, Paul Krugman has written on his 
blog (October 31, 2008):  
 
“Eastern Europe 2008 = East Asia 1997. The key to the Asian crisis—and of 
Argentina’s collapse in 2002—was the way domestic players leveraged 
themselves up with foreign-currency loans. When the capital inflows dried up, and 
the Asian currencies plunged, these debts suddenly became a much bigger burden, 
decimating balance sheets and causing a downward spiral of deleveraging. And 
here we go again.” 
 
Our perspective on the prognosis is as follows. The world has been subject to a 
massive shock. The waves from this shock have continued to extend their reach, 
including in their fold a wider range of financial instruments and markets and a broader 
range of countries. With the announcement that Chinese exports had fallen on a year-on-
year basis in November, the crisis had clearly delivered a blow Asia. Growth forecasts for 
2009 and 2010 continue to be marked down—the process is ongoing and the results are 
not known. Within the context of this broad correlated shock, markets have differentiated 
countries. Our reading of the data is that the country differentiation is greater than 
regional differentiation. In turn, the country differentiation reflects specific policies and 
vulnerabilities that are being spotlighted and, possibly, amplified by the global shock.  
 
If we examine indicators measuring financial stress, such as stock prices, 
sovereign bond spreads, and exchange rates, systematic singling out of the CEE does not 
appear to have occurred. In particular, while CEE countries appear to have experienced 
greater financial stress as measured by stock price indexes, they have, as a group, been 
less severely hit based on sovereign bond spreads. To illustrate this point, Figure 11 
shows the median stock price index (bordered by the 25
th and 75
th percentile indices) with 
January 1, 2006 as the base, and the EMBI sovereign bond spread. Relative to it’s peak, 
the median stock-price index fell 66 percent for the CEE, 35 percent for Latin America, 
and 50 percent for the Asian countries in our sample. However, the data on sovereign 
bond spreads–available only for a few countries—suggests a more favorable performance 
for the CEE. Limited though the data are, they suggest that sovereign bond spreads 
increased less for the CEE than for the other regions. While the correlated risks across the 
world have raised spreads in the CEE, these have gone up elsewhere also. 
Luengnaruemitchai and Schadler (2007) in analysis before the recent crisis argued that 
the spreads in the CEEs were lower not only in absolute terms but also after controlling 
for country features explaining bond spreads. Average spreads in the CEEs still appear 
low. 
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As such, the evidence points to particular hot spots associated with specific 
vulnerabilities within each region. Hungary had difficulties in rolling over its public debt 
and asked the IMF and the international community for financial support. The markets’ 
early focus on Hungary reflected chronic budget deficits and rising public debt. While 
these have come under greater control in the past few years, the recent history of missed 
targets will require sustained effort to rebuild a reputation for fiscal discipline. In this 
sense, the stress on Hungarian bond and currency markets reflected markets’ traditional 
concern with sovereign policy credibility and long-term fiscal sustainability. Latvia with 
its large current account deficits has also sought external financial support. The Latvian 
story is more clearly tied to the specific CEE growth model. The Latvian case was one 
where that model was pushed hard, exceeding by most measures the appropriate speed 
limits. In Abiad, Leigh, and Mody (2008), we argue that although Latvia’s relatively low 
per capita income and its financial integration into Europe created the basis for running a 
significant current account deficit, the actual deficits in 2006 and 2007 were well above 
those norms. 
 
Countries in other regions are facing their own stresses. Asian economies have, 
for such an eventuality, built up significant foreign exchange reserves. But as the crisis 
has spread, and their short-term growth prospects have dimmed, countries within Asia 
have faced differing degrees of financial pressure associated with the rollover of private 
international debt. Indonesia and Korea have experienced sharp currency depreciation and 
are continuing to lose foreign exchange reserves. While policy responses have helped 
mitigate the pressures, these examples further emphasize that, even within the context of 
a global shock, markets have not been guided by perceptions of common regional 
vulnerabilities but have thus far been more subtle in the distinctions made.
12 
 
  The fallout from the financial tensions will continue. The deleveraging of the 
financial sector can be expected to interact with a weakening global economy, creating a 
financial-accelerator-like process. The intensity of this process will depend, however, in 
significant part on the wisdom and the international coordination of the policies adopted. 
As such, the test of the CEE model will continue to unfold. Our analysis offers some 
grounds for hope. The strength of institutions developed over the past 15 years or so 
should provide considerable flexibility and buffers to absorb the shocks. 
 
VI.   CONCLUSIONS 
Looking across the regions, the role of trade openness stands out as a central 
element of the growth process. East Asia has harnessed the potential of such openness 
over a long period of time to reinforce and renew its growth and the CEE experience of 
the last 15 years
                                                 
12 Particularities of countries include their relationships to international banks of varying strengths and 
vulnerabilities.    29  
 
confirms that association. The use of cross-country regressions to infer causal effect of 
trade openness on growth has often been questioned (see Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000). It 
is possible, and indeed, likely that the causation works both ways, but what is clear is that 
over any medium-term spell, growth and trade openness are strongly associated with each 
other. Openness brings ideas and competition—competition not just to local producers of 
goods and services, but competition also in the political arena, helping challenge 
constituencies favoring the status quo. The continued lag in trade openness remains an 
important distinguishing feature of Latin America. As Zettlemeyer (2006) notes, the 
reduction of tariff barriers has helped; but, possibly non-tariff regulatory barriers have 
held back a more dynamic relationship with international markets.
13 
 
Seen over an extended period of the past half century, East Asia’s performance 
remains remarkable for the strength and persistence of its growth. The most successful of 
the economies of this region have been consistently able to renew themselves, 
overcoming their own growth bottlenecks and adapting to the changing international 
environment. In this perspective, the CEE achievements, while clearly impressive, are 
more recent and the ability of their approach to deliver sustained increases in standards of 
living remains to proven.  
 
As such, the major achievement of the CEE—an achievement of interest to 
analysts of the development and growth process but more so to policymakers in the 
region who must sake to preserve it—is the harnessing of market forces in the context of 
rapid globalization and alongside an unequivocal commitment to open domestic 
democratic processes. As this paper has argued, the CEE economies have gone farther in 
using the potential of global markets than other regions. This has been so especially with 
regard to financial openness where the continued push towards increased financial 
integration has been remarkable not only for its strength but also because the others have 
turned their back on it just as the CEEs have pushed forward. In doing so, they were able 
to give their populations an earlier consumption dividend from this growth and 
integration process than has typically been possible in prior growth episodes. 
 
To the extent that this model has been successful, some would argue that it is not 
replicable. The CEE economies—despite the trauma of the first transition from central 
planning—emerged with a distinguishing depth of human capital. Moreover, as they 
transitioned from their former isolation, they found themselves in the midst of thriving 
product and financial markets. And, the embrace into the EU, through its emphasis on 
regulatory harmonization, strengthened institutional structures and, by reducing the 
barrier of “borders,” reinforced their integration into European markets. Testing these 
propositions is no easy task, and we do not attempt it here. Nevertheless, in recent work, 
we have argued that this experience may well provide some valuable lessons for the 
                                                 
13 There are other, some would argue more important, factors that have held back Latin American growth, 
including a heavier reliance on natural resources, deeper inequalities, and a political and economic 
interaction that generates greater volatility (Zettlemeyer, 2006) reviews the many strands of these 
discussions.    30  
opportunities that will arise as nations become more financially integrated (Abiad, Leigh, 
and Mody, 2008). 
 
Looking ahead, the CEEs face three challenges. The first is from financial 
integration itself. The longer the global turbulence continues, the more the CEE model 
will be tested. It is already clear that the Baltic nations are facing a severe pull back in 
their growth rates. This is not completely surprising: they were growing at a pace that was 
perhaps in any case not sustainable. The retrenchment of external capital has ensured a 
more rapid curtailment than many had expected. The test of the model will lie in whether 
the Baltics or other countries in the region face a more traditional “sudden stop,” with 
severe output losses. If that were to happen, concerns from prior developmental 
experiences to accelerate growth with foreign capital will be reinforced. This test is going 
to be a severe one to the extent that it occurs in the context of a broader global and 
systemic retrenchment of financial markets. In that sense, a reading of the ongoing 
experience will need to distinguish between large exogenous global shocks and 
unsustainable debt structures that in the past have triggered emerging market crises. 
 
Beyond the immediate concerns, there remains the challenge of generating 
continuing productivity growth. Some part of the achievement in this regard may well 
have been easy pickings as capital and labor were more productively deployed. But 
clearly, the shifts in production structure and quality are evidence that a more 
fundamental transformation has also occurred. The question is: can this continue? And, if 
not, will the relentless appreciation of the real exchange rate (as prices and wages move 
towards levels of advanced European nations) undermine competitiveness. That this is no 
idle speculation has been emphasized by Blanchard (2006) in his review of the 
Portuguese experience. Entry into the euro area allowed the Portuguese economy to 
attract foreign capital and grow rapidly. But a failure to strengthen internal sources of 
productivity abruptly changed the dynamic. From large current account deficits and high 
growth, Portugal went to continued large external deficits and low growth. Blanchard 
warns that when placed in this setting of external deficits and low growth, the policy 
options are limited and returning to the more virtuous growth cycle is difficult. 
 
And, that highlights the final challenge. While the forces of globalization—and 
must—be usefully harnessed to achieve long-term growth, domestic policies must keep 
pace to productively participate in that potential but also to guard against adverse 
developments. Going forward, the task becomes harder as political constituencies are 
more effectively able to pursue their self interest. No where is this more of an issue than 
in the allocation of budgetary resources, which in turn reflects broader policy priorities. 
The nature of institutional development that the CEE are now embarked on is subtler and 
more complex than the more basic institutions of governance and property rights that they 
successfully established. Creating checks and balances in a complex democracy that 
allows for the expression of many voices while ensuring the public good is not just the 
next challenge, it is a continuing one.
14
                                                 




Abiad, Abdul, Daniel Leigh, and Ashoka Mody, 2008, “International Finance, Capital 
Mobility, and Income Convergence,” International Monetary Fund, mimeo. 
 
Blanchard, Olivier, 2006, “Adjustment within the Euro: the Difficult Case of Portugal,” 
mimeo, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2007, “Polity IV 
Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2007,” 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm  
 
Chinn, Menzie and Hiro Ito, 2006, “What Matters for Financial Development? Capital 
Controls, Institutions, and Interactions,” Journal of Development Economics, 
Volume 81, Issue 1, pp. 163-192 (October). 
 
Claessens, Stijn, Neeltje Van Horen, Tugba Gurcanlar, and Joaquin Mercado Sapiain, 
2008, “Foreign Bank Presence in Developing Countries 1995–2006: Data and 
Trends” (unpublished; Washington: World Bank, March). 
 
Danninger, Stephan, and Florence Jaumotte, 2008, “Divergence of Current Account 
Balances Across Emerging Economies,” IMF World Economic Outlook 
(September 2008). 
 
Easterly, William, 2007, “Was Development Assistance a Mistake?” American Economic 
Review Papers and Proceedings, May, pp. 328-332. 
 
European Commission, 2003, “European Competition Report, 2003,” Commission Staff 
Working Document, SEC(2003)1299.  
 
European Commission, 2006, “Enlargement Two Years After—An Economic 
Evaluation,” Occasional Paper, No. 24, ISSN1725-3209. 
  
Fabrizio, Stefania, Deniz Igan, and Ashoka Mody, 2006, “The Dynamics of Product 
Quality and International Competitiveness,” IMF Working Paper No. 07/97, 
International Monetary Fund. 
 
Fabrizio, Stefania and Ashoka Mody, 2006, “Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political 
Indiscipline?” Economic Policy, Vol.21, pp. 689-739. 
 
Fabrizio, Stefania and Ashoka Mody, 2008, “Breaking the impediments to budgetary 
reforms: evidence from Europe,” IMF Working Paper No. 08/82, International 
Monetary Fund.. 
 
Fischer, Stanley and Ratna Sahay, 2004, “Transition Economies: the role of institutions 
and initial conditions,” Festschrift in honor of Guillermo Calvo, April 15-16, 
2004, International Monetary Fund. 
 
Hausmann, Ricardo, Lant Pritchett, and Dani Rodrik, 2005, “Growth Accelerations,” 
Journal of Economic Growth, 10(4): 303-329. 
    32  
Herrmann, Sabine, and Adalbert Winkler, 2008, “Real Convergence, Financial Markets, 
and the Current Account—Emerging Europe versus Emerging Asia,” ECB 
Occasional Paper No. 88 (Frankfurt am Main: European Central Bank, June). 
 
Jones, Benjamin F., and Benjamin A. Olken, 2005, “The Anatomy of Start-Stop Growth,” 
NBER Working Paper No. 11528. 
 
Luengnaruemitchai, P., and S. Schadler, 2007, “Do Economists’ and Financial Markets’ 
Perspectives on the New Members of the EU Differ?” IMF Working Paper 
No.07/65, International Monetary Fund. 
 
Prasad, Eswar, Raghuram Rajan, and Arvind Subramanian, 2006, “Patterns of 
International Capital Flows and their Implications for Economic Development,” 
presented at the symposium, “The New Economic Geography: Effects and Policy 
Implications,” The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, 
Wyoming, August 24-26. 
http://www.kc.frb.org/PUBLICAT/SYMPOS/2006/sym06prg.htm.  
 
Rodriguez, Francisco and Dani Rodrik, 2000, “Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A 
Skeptic's Guide to the Cross-National Evidence,” in Macroeconomics Annual 
2000, eds. Ben Bernanke and Kenneth S. Rogoff, MIT Press for NBER, 
Cambridge, MA, 2001 
 
Rodrik, Dani, 2008, “The Real Exchange Rate and Economic Growth,” John F. Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Roland, Gérard, 2005, “After Enlargement: Institutional Achievements and Prospects in 
the New Member States,” Proceedings of the Third ECB conference The New EU 
Member States: Convergence and Stability, 2005.     
 
Schadler, Susan, Ashoka Mody, Abdul Abiad, and Daniel Leigh, 2006. Growth in the 
Central and Eastern European Countries of the European Union. IMF Occasional 
Paper No. 252. Washington: International Monetary Fund. 
 
Wade, Robert, 1990, “Governing the Market,” Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
World Bank, 1993, “The Making of the East Asia Miracle: Economic Growth and 
Economic Policy,” Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, 2006, “Growth and Reforms in Latin America: A Survey of Facts 
and Arguments,” IMF Working Paper No. 06/210, International Monetary Fund. 